Hey Peter,

Yeah, we've talked a bit about it.  He went and lectured at Oxford on the subject about six months or so ago.  The goal in Iraq as he sees it is similar to post WWII Japan, but the situations are entirely different.

For one, though Japan had been defeated in a costly war, the industrial and bureacratic infrastructure remained relatively intact.  It was a difficult but not impossible task in Japan to root out the fascists, imperialists, and the blatantly corrupt (though most of them found their way back in power within the decade) without disrupting the flow of services and the transition to a new constitution and a new economy. 

To the contrary, in Iraq, the infrastructure has been almost completely destroyed,  over years of sanctions, Saddam's Baath party thuggery muggery, and of course, the war and its aftermath.  To rebuild Iraq is to start from zero, or even Less Than Zero.

Also, in Japan, there was no real danger of a civil war after WWII. 

In Iraq, the Shiite majority has been brutally repressed since the 60's by Baathists and the Sunni minority.  That kind of repression leaves obvious resentments, which then flare up under the present conditions of anarchy, creating a real danger of civil war, or at the very least, a massive and bloody series of reprisals and counter reprisals.  Picture an Ameriucan inner city, if the military built an armed perimeter around it, keeping everybody trapped in side, making sporadic raids to arrest or kill the worst gang offenders, but otherwise didnt maintain order. Add to that sporadic electricity, no clean water, little food, three digit temperatures, a massive number of fully automatic weapons and other military hardware, and no history of cooperation among its citizens.  Pretty tough situation, probably. 

In Japan, there was an overwhelming and continuing US military presence, leaving no doubt who was in charge.

In Iraq, small squads of US military and paramilitary try to enforce order, but are under manned and under funded.  A police force needs to be primarily a peacable device, SWAT tactics aside, for the most part overwhelming with bland numbers , calm, and continuing presence.  A military unit on the other hand is designed to strike quickly and destructively, then establishing its own perimeter of defense, etc...  One would probably need another 300-400,000 US and UN troops in Iraq for a decade or so, with sensitive mediation, firm laws, lots and lots of money, and open communication between all parties  to accomplish any lasting peace.  What's more likely is that the US will start reincorporating members of Saddam's police and intelligence brigades, who will start going around busting heads and passing out favors, just to restore the appearance of order, though at the cost of any real reform, or of any real good will towards the US.   

Maybe Andrea or I could get and post a copy of our Hans' lecture, which will be better than my probably inaccurate remembrance of his thoughts...