How the Northern Alliance Plans to Win the War
Paul Quinn-Judge reports on the U.S.'s three front war in Afghanistan and the anti-Taliban forces plan to take Kabul
Graphic: Ground War
Afghanistan: Another Day's Bombing in Jalalabad
Cnn: U.S. Ground Troops in Action
Friday, Oct. 19, 2001
Rabat, 25 miles from Kabul By the standards of this soporific war, the front line at Rabat was quite lively this week. A rocket exploded in front of the trenches as we approached, sending up an impressive cloud of gray dust, and a few bullets from a Taliban position 500 or so meters away whistled lazily through the air. The Taliban do this about 5:30 every evening, a local commander said.
Just then Taliban anti-aircraft guns a couple of miles away opened up. They do not seem to be aiming with any precision � most guidance systems have been taken out by the bombing of Kabul. Instead they seem to be groping blindly through the sky, in the general direction of a plane, which circled unconcerned, high above our heads. A local guerrilla, a sort of village idiot with an RPG (rocket propelled grenade), climbed out the trench and did a clumsy pantomime, pretending in the full view of the Taliban to be shooting down the plane with his rocket propelled grenade. Suddenly there was an explosion in the distance, but for the first time in this war the smoke could be seen on this side of the mountains surrounding Kabul. The U.S., it seemed, had finally started to do what the Northern Alliance military commanders had been praying for: they were attacking Taliban frontline positions.
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Oct. 22, 2001
Past Issues Facing the Fury Oct. 15, 2001 ----------------- How Real Is the Threat? Oct. 8, 2001 ----------------- Life on the Home Front Oct. 1, 2001 ----------------- One Nation, Indivisible Sept. 24, 2001 ----------------- Day of Infamy Sept. 14, 2001
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Well, not quite. They were indeed hitting this side of the mountains, closing in on an impressive series of Taliban positions just opposite the Northern Alliance camp at Bagram airbase. But as the week ended they had dropped only half a dozen or so bombs, and the Alliance Commanders were fuming. "It's a joke," said General Said Khel, who commands one of the fronts north of Kabul and will be one of the generals who will lead the advance on the capital, if the attack ever takes place. The raids will have the effect of increasing Taliban morale not destroying it, he predicted.
U.S. air war strategists probably agree. They have long argued that an effective airstrike against the military position should be sudden, devastating and terrifying. The strikes should leave the survivors disoriented and incapable of fighting. Small strikes, they argue, have the opposite affect, working like inoculations. Soldiers become used to the raids, scornful of them, and gradually lose their fear. Around Kabul the U.S. has opted for small strikes. This is not quite the torrent of fire that U.S. psywar communications here have threatened to unleash on the Taliban.
The U.S. Strategy
Seen from here, the U.S. seems to be fighting three wars in Afghanistan. In the north, they apparently assume that the United Front/Northern Alliance, with its predominance of Cajiks, Uzbeks and other northern ethnic groups, has a right to reassert its control. In the center, on the Kabul front, U.S. assistance is invisible, and North Alliance irritation with the Americans is tangible. In the south, where there are no Alliance troops, the U.S. Friday sent in their own, more than a hundred on a mission around Kandahar. The U.S. has also deployed the sort of killing machines, AC 130's for example, that could change the strategic balance around Kabul in a matter of days if not hours.
The Northern Alliance strategy
On paper, at least, this is elegance itself. The fact that it is, as some Alliance leaders admit, inspired by the domino theory should give some cause for concern. It does not here.
The theory goes like this: A victory in a major city in the north, like Mazar-I-Sharif, will provoke a total collapse of Taliban forces. The soft core Taliban fighters � mujahideen who defected in 1996 to protect either regional or personal interests � will break away, while the supply lines of the hard core Talib will be shattered. Once the north has been secured, the Alliance will move on Kabul. They will push as far as the edge of the city, however, but will not enter, in deference to the terrible memories of chaos and pillage in 1992 when they last captured the city. Instead, Gen. Fazel Ahmad Azimi told TIME, they will send in a 3000 -man force drawn in equal proportions from the interior, public security and the defense ministries to ensure law and order.
At the same time, Alliance leaders like Interior Minister Mohammed Yunus Kanuni can only say, "Commanders on the Kabul front are ready to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself in their zone of responsibility." Earlier this week, in fact, commanders were predicting "small victories" in the Kabul area in the coming days. None has transpired. In reality, the military along the Kabul front are being reined in.
The commanders insist they can move on Kabul at any time, even without airstrikes on Taliban front lines. Other officers worry that any delay will allow the Taliban to reveal their positions in Kabul and restore their morale. Time, in other words, is running out. Ramadan is less than a month away, and more importantly, so is winter, when military operations are severely hampered. Some commanders, when pushed � Azimi, for example � still predict an advance on Kabul in the next week or so. But, they sound neither convinced nor convincing. Alliance political leaders meanwhile deny any external interference in their planning. "The decision to attack will be ours alone," said Kanuni. The criteria on which they will base this decision, however, are becoming increasingly vague.
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Paul Quinn-Judge reports on the U.S.'s three front war in Afghanistan and the anti-Taliban forces plan to take Kabul
Graphic: Ground War
Afghanistan: Another Day's Bombing in Jalalabad
Cnn: U.S. Ground Troops in Action
Friday, Oct. 19, 2001
Rabat, 25 miles from Kabul By the standards of this soporific war, the front line at Rabat was quite lively this week. A rocket exploded in front of the trenches as we approached, sending up an impressive cloud of gray dust, and a few bullets from a Taliban position 500 or so meters away whistled lazily through the air. The Taliban do this about 5:30 every evening, a local commander said.
Just then Taliban anti-aircraft guns a couple of miles away opened up. They do not seem to be aiming with any precision � most guidance systems have been taken out by the bombing of Kabul. Instead they seem to be groping blindly through the sky, in the general direction of a plane, which circled unconcerned, high above our heads. A local guerrilla, a sort of village idiot with an RPG (rocket propelled grenade), climbed out the trench and did a clumsy pantomime, pretending in the full view of the Taliban to be shooting down the plane with his rocket propelled grenade. Suddenly there was an explosion in the distance, but for the first time in this war the smoke could be seen on this side of the mountains surrounding Kabul. The U.S., it seemed, had finally started to do what the Northern Alliance military commanders had been praying for: they were attacking Taliban frontline positions.
INTERACTIVE GRAPHICS
Anthrax: Path of a Pathogen
Next Front: A Ground War
FBI Files: Most Wanted Terrorists
Safety Guide: Protect your family from bioterrorism
More GraphicsAnthrax PathogenA Ground WarAn Uneasy AllyTargets HitSearch & DestroyFirepower & FoodFrozen AssetsSafety GuideMiddle East LeadersAgents of DeathAfghanistanMilitary BuildupTerrorist CellsOur WeaponsPaths of DestructionTwin Terrors
CNN.com
Latest news on America's New War
THIS WEEK'S MAGAZINE
The Fear Factor
Oct. 22, 2001
Past Issues Facing the Fury Oct. 15, 2001 ----------------- How Real Is the Threat? Oct. 8, 2001 ----------------- Life on the Home Front Oct. 1, 2001 ----------------- One Nation, Indivisible Sept. 24, 2001 ----------------- Day of Infamy Sept. 14, 2001
PHOTO ESSAYS
The Food Aid Lands
Fighting Back
U.S. Strikes
More Photos >>>
MORE STORIES
Anthrax: Latest developments
Bin Laden: Ready for Your Close-up?
Afghanistan: The Perils of Nation-Building
More Stories >>>
Well, not quite. They were indeed hitting this side of the mountains, closing in on an impressive series of Taliban positions just opposite the Northern Alliance camp at Bagram airbase. But as the week ended they had dropped only half a dozen or so bombs, and the Alliance Commanders were fuming. "It's a joke," said General Said Khel, who commands one of the fronts north of Kabul and will be one of the generals who will lead the advance on the capital, if the attack ever takes place. The raids will have the effect of increasing Taliban morale not destroying it, he predicted.
U.S. air war strategists probably agree. They have long argued that an effective airstrike against the military position should be sudden, devastating and terrifying. The strikes should leave the survivors disoriented and incapable of fighting. Small strikes, they argue, have the opposite affect, working like inoculations. Soldiers become used to the raids, scornful of them, and gradually lose their fear. Around Kabul the U.S. has opted for small strikes. This is not quite the torrent of fire that U.S. psywar communications here have threatened to unleash on the Taliban.
The U.S. Strategy
Seen from here, the U.S. seems to be fighting three wars in Afghanistan. In the north, they apparently assume that the United Front/Northern Alliance, with its predominance of Cajiks, Uzbeks and other northern ethnic groups, has a right to reassert its control. In the center, on the Kabul front, U.S. assistance is invisible, and North Alliance irritation with the Americans is tangible. In the south, where there are no Alliance troops, the U.S. Friday sent in their own, more than a hundred on a mission around Kandahar. The U.S. has also deployed the sort of killing machines, AC 130's for example, that could change the strategic balance around Kabul in a matter of days if not hours.
The Northern Alliance strategy
On paper, at least, this is elegance itself. The fact that it is, as some Alliance leaders admit, inspired by the domino theory should give some cause for concern. It does not here.
The theory goes like this: A victory in a major city in the north, like Mazar-I-Sharif, will provoke a total collapse of Taliban forces. The soft core Taliban fighters � mujahideen who defected in 1996 to protect either regional or personal interests � will break away, while the supply lines of the hard core Talib will be shattered. Once the north has been secured, the Alliance will move on Kabul. They will push as far as the edge of the city, however, but will not enter, in deference to the terrible memories of chaos and pillage in 1992 when they last captured the city. Instead, Gen. Fazel Ahmad Azimi told TIME, they will send in a 3000 -man force drawn in equal proportions from the interior, public security and the defense ministries to ensure law and order.
At the same time, Alliance leaders like Interior Minister Mohammed Yunus Kanuni can only say, "Commanders on the Kabul front are ready to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself in their zone of responsibility." Earlier this week, in fact, commanders were predicting "small victories" in the Kabul area in the coming days. None has transpired. In reality, the military along the Kabul front are being reined in.
The commanders insist they can move on Kabul at any time, even without airstrikes on Taliban front lines. Other officers worry that any delay will allow the Taliban to reveal their positions in Kabul and restore their morale. Time, in other words, is running out. Ramadan is less than a month away, and more importantly, so is winter, when military operations are severely hampered. Some commanders, when pushed � Azimi, for example � still predict an advance on Kabul in the next week or so. But, they sound neither convinced nor convincing. Alliance political leaders meanwhile deny any external interference in their planning. "The decision to attack will be ours alone," said Kanuni. The criteria on which they will base this decision, however, are becoming increasingly vague.
