Lessons From Vietnam
It may be that on Saddam's capture that now the
exhausted, brutalised, shellshocked residents of
Baghdad will start lining up to buy copies of Thomas
Jefferson's collected works, will start quoting Thomas
Paine and Benjamin Franklin to one another over coffee,
will start contemplating Voltaire and the roots of the
Enlightenment on the French Revolution...
It may be that the exhausted citizenry of Baghdad will turn
docile, cowed, meek--will bow their heads to the
inevitable triumph of the superior Western brands of arms,
money, and government. Those scenarios would be
surprising for any length of time, given the fact that, in the
words of a friend of mine who studies these kinds of
things, "to an Iraqi, 500 years ago is recent history."
Witness Belfast, which cannot expunge itself of the
memory of William of Orange, lo these many years, in
spite of the efforts of Seinfeld, Linkin Park, and the
undeniable commitment of the British Army.The following is from Billmon--- Vietnam-era Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
explained that he doesn't feel it that it's appropriate for
him to comment on the conduct of the war in Iraq. But it's
not too hard to guess what he probably thinks, based on
his own experiences and the conclusions he has drawn
about them. In his unique 1995 book In Retrospect,
McNamara listed eleven lessons from Vietnam that are
very much worth reflecting on.------------------------------------------------------------------------McNamara wrote,It is sometimes said that the post-Cold War world will be
so different from the world of the past that the lessons of
Vietnam will be inapplicable or of no relevance to the
twenty-first century. I disagree... There were eleven major
major causes for our disaster in Vietnam:1. We misjudged then--as we have since--the geopolitical
intentions of our adversaries... and we exaggerated the
dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in
terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for--
and a determination to fight for--freedom and democracy.
We totally misjudged the political forces within the
country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to
motivate a people... to fight and die for their beliefs and
values--and we continue to do so today in many parts of
the world.
4. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our
profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of
the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of
their leaders...
5. We failed then--as we have since--to recognize the
limitations of modern, high-technology equipment, forces
and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly
motivated people's movements. We failed as well to adapt
our military forces to the task of winning the hearts and
minds of people from a totally different culture.
6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people
into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and
cons of a large-scale U.S. military involvement... before
we initiated the action.
7. After the action got underway and unanticipated events
forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain
popular support in part because we did not explain fully
what was happening and why we were doing what we
did. We had not prepared the public to understand the
complex events we faced and how to react constructively
to the need for changes in course as the nation
confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment. A
nation's deepest strength lies not in military prowess but,
rather, in the the unity of its people. We failed to maintain
it.
8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our
leaders are omniscient. Where our own security is not
directly at stake, our judgment of what is in another
people's or country's best interest should be put to the test
of open discussion in international forums. We do not
have the God-given right to shape every nation in our
own image or as we choose.
9. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action-
-other than in response to direct threats to our own
security--should be carried out only in conjuction with
multinational forces supported fully (and not merely
cosmetically) by the international community.
10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as
in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which
there are no immediate solutions... at times, we may have
to live an imperfect, untidy world.
11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to
organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal
effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of
political and military issues...
These were our major failures, in their essence. Though
set forth separately, they are all in some way linked:
failure in one area contributed to or compounded failure
in another. Each became a turn in a terrible knot.
Pointing out these mistakes allows us to map the lessons
of Vietnam, and places us in a position to apply them to
the post-Cold War world.
It is fair to say that McNamara's lessons remain relevant
today, because they remain unlearned.
B
Baerwald
(view)
It may be that on Saddam's capture that now the
exhausted, brutalised, shellshocked residents of
Baghdad will start lining up to buy copies of Thomas
Jefferson's collected works, will start quoting Thomas
Paine and Benjamin Franklin to one another over coffee,
will start contemplating Voltaire and the roots of the
Enlightenment on the French Revolution...
It may be that the exhausted citizenry of Baghdad will turn
docile, cowed, meek--will bow their heads to the
inevitable triumph of the superior Western brands of arms,
money, and government. Those scenarios would be
surprising for any length of time, given the fact that, in the
words of a friend of mine who studies these kinds of
things, "to an Iraqi, 500 years ago is recent history."
Witness Belfast, which cannot expunge itself of the
memory of William of Orange, lo these many years, in
spite of the efforts of Seinfeld, Linkin Park, and the
undeniable commitment of the British Army.The following is from Billmon--- Vietnam-era Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
explained that he doesn't feel it that it's appropriate for
him to comment on the conduct of the war in Iraq. But it's
not too hard to guess what he probably thinks, based on
his own experiences and the conclusions he has drawn
about them. In his unique 1995 book In Retrospect,
McNamara listed eleven lessons from Vietnam that are
very much worth reflecting on.------------------------------------------------------------------------McNamara wrote,It is sometimes said that the post-Cold War world will be
so different from the world of the past that the lessons of
Vietnam will be inapplicable or of no relevance to the
twenty-first century. I disagree... There were eleven major
major causes for our disaster in Vietnam:1. We misjudged then--as we have since--the geopolitical
intentions of our adversaries... and we exaggerated the
dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in
terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for--
and a determination to fight for--freedom and democracy.
We totally misjudged the political forces within the
country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to
motivate a people... to fight and die for their beliefs and
values--and we continue to do so today in many parts of
the world.
4. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our
profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of
the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of
their leaders...
5. We failed then--as we have since--to recognize the
limitations of modern, high-technology equipment, forces
and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly
motivated people's movements. We failed as well to adapt
our military forces to the task of winning the hearts and
minds of people from a totally different culture.
6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people
into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and
cons of a large-scale U.S. military involvement... before
we initiated the action.
7. After the action got underway and unanticipated events
forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain
popular support in part because we did not explain fully
what was happening and why we were doing what we
did. We had not prepared the public to understand the
complex events we faced and how to react constructively
to the need for changes in course as the nation
confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment. A
nation's deepest strength lies not in military prowess but,
rather, in the the unity of its people. We failed to maintain
it.
8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our
leaders are omniscient. Where our own security is not
directly at stake, our judgment of what is in another
people's or country's best interest should be put to the test
of open discussion in international forums. We do not
have the God-given right to shape every nation in our
own image or as we choose.
9. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action-
-other than in response to direct threats to our own
security--should be carried out only in conjuction with
multinational forces supported fully (and not merely
cosmetically) by the international community.
10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as
in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which
there are no immediate solutions... at times, we may have
to live an imperfect, untidy world.
11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to
organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal
effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of
political and military issues...
These were our major failures, in their essence. Though
set forth separately, they are all in some way linked:
failure in one area contributed to or compounded failure
in another. Each became a turn in a terrible knot.
Pointing out these mistakes allows us to map the lessons
of Vietnam, and places us in a position to apply them to
the post-Cold War world.
It is fair to say that McNamara's lessons remain relevant
today, because they remain unlearned.
